Abstract-As system of systems (SoS) models become increasingly complex and interconnected, a new approach is needed to capture the effects of humans within the SoS. Many real-life events have shown the detrimental outcomes of failing to account for humans in the loop. This research introduces a novel and cross-disciplinary methodology for modeling humans interacting with technologies to perform tasks within an SoS, specifically within a layered physical security system use case. Metrics and formulations developed for this new way of looking at SoS, termed sociotechnical SoS, allow for the quantification of the interplay of effectiveness and efficiency seen in detection theory to measure the ability of a physical security system to detect and respond to threats. This methodology has been applied to a notional representation of a small military Forward Operating Base (FOB) as a proof-of-concept.
I. INTRODUCTION
System of Systems (SoS) theoretical and computational modeling approaches emerged from the engineering field [1] and are still strongly oriented towards engineered rather than human systems. If humans are included, it is often in rather peripheral roles as system managers or as participants with known performance parameters. Illustrating an alternative and more robust approach, the SoS prototype modeling approach described here fully incorporates both the engineered and human systems and their interactions. To represent the human system, the research team conducted a job task analysis and developed and modeled associated business rules based on information elicited from subject matter experts (SMEs), and from reviews of publicly available sources and descriptions of the targeted application. The job task analysis also identified technologies necessary for task performance. Technical expertise, resident in the team and acquired from SMEs, helped the modeling team understand how these technologies were designed, constructed, tested, and used. An SoS modeling approach integrated the human and the technical systems, while simulations, run under a variety of conditions, illustrated how error or failure rates of the SoS are a function of the interaction of the human and technical systems, not simply a combination of separately calculated performance measures.
II. SOCIOTECHNICAL SYSTEM OF SYSTEMS
The SoS modeling approach described here assumes the modeling target to be a sociotechnical SoS, an SoS type which is much different than an engineered SoS with limited human support. A sociotechnical SoS is simultaneously a highly complex technical SoS with all the attendant assumptions of purpose-built design based on scientific and engineering principles, and a dynamic human organization, designed with mindfulness but with some component of emergent social relationships and behaviors [2, 3, 4] . In a sociotechnical SoS, these two qualitatively different types of systems must interact. Organizational operations in sociotechnical SoS thus involve the difficult problem of managing a complex social system, a complex technical system, and the interactions of the two systems as they work together [5, 6, 7] . This yields what Perrow [5] calls 'interactive complexity' -a system complex enough that its designers can not envisage all points of failure. If the system is also tightly coupled, as is inherent to SoS, the probabilities of overall system failure increase dramatically. If the system is one in which failure could lead to catastrophic consequences, the problem is characterized as a 'high reliability problem' [6, 7, 8] . Related to this is the concept of high reliability organizations (HROs). Weick and Sutcliffe suggest that "The hallmark of an HRO is not that it is error-free but that errors don't disable it" [8] . They emphasize that HROs are organizations where disabling, catastrophic, highly visible accidents could have happened-but did not. Reliability thus becomes what they call "a dynamic nonevent" [8] . Understanding of possible points of failure, such as those made visible through the modeling approach described here, allows an organization to continue to operate in spite of these inevitable system failures.
III. APPLICATIONS TO LAYERED SECURITY
Examples from the security domain show the value of understanding the complexity and interaction of human and engineered systems, and of treating such systems as sociotechnical systems. An analysis of 23 layered security systems in high consequence environments by Lafleur et al. showed that the point of failure in all systems was not the technical components but the human, and the way in which the humans engaged with the technical systems [9] . These same conclusions can be drawn after analyzing a wide variety of events from the security breach at Y-12, to the accident at Three Mile Island, to the detonation of a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) at Patrol Base Bushmaster.
This project took its target example from the security domain, and addressed a complex layered security problem. This allowed us to illustrate how we would approach SoS problems (layered security, almost by definition, is a SoS) in a sociotechnical environment, and puts the problem in the high reliability realm. The application is perimeter security on a fictitious military forward operating base (FOB) used to support tactical operations in a combat zone, manned by 100-250 individuals. However, the approach described here has broad application. In addition to other layered security problems such as airports, this modeling approach could also be used in any environment where there is a high level of interaction among humans and between humans and technology. A group of emergency responders in a disaster situation, persons in a household interacting with various interconnected technical devices (i.e., the internet of things), control room operations of a wide variety of types (e.g., a nuclear power facility, an electric grid switching station, or an airport control tower), or hospital emergency or operating rooms are examples of applications that would be appropriate for a sociotechnical SoS modeling approach.
IV. SIMULATING A SOCIOTECHNICAL SYSTEM OF SYSTEMS
The combination of human and technical systems in a single modeling project to represent layered security on a FOB required a highly diverse modeling team including applied mathematicians, anthropologists, computer modelers, and industrial and experimental psychologists. The chosen area of application also required domain expertise in military organization and performance, military technologies, computational modeling, and military doctrine and policy. As more SoS modeling takes on a sociotechnical approach, the assembly of such diverse teams will become not only more common, but also necessary to properly capture the many facets of the SoS. The use case model representing the FOB is built in FlexSim [10] , an off-the-shelf discrete event simulation software traditionally used for manufacturing models. It offers flexibility through custom logic flow definition and can thus handle a wide array of models and logic, and can accommodate parameters associated with both human and physical/technical resources. FlexSim creates a 3-dimensional simulation from an underlying process flow model coded by the model developers. The visual representation of the notional FOB at time zero is shown in Fig. 1 . 
A. Cognitive Task Analysis
The simulation is constructed as a series of tasks. Cognitive task analysis techniques were used to elicit from SMEs "the knowledge and processes" they use for these tasks [11] . SMEs provided information such as task duration, qualifications of those actually assigned to specific tasks (distinct from the qualifications of those supposed to be assigned to the tasks as outlined in operating procedures and other official documents), technologies available and used, factors that would degrade performance such as fatigue, and (for this use case) points and methods of interaction with non-English speaking host nationals who also may have been involved in perimeter defense 1 . This elicited knowledge was supplemented through review of official doctrine and training materials, and from military magazine articles, blogs, YouTube videos, and other publically available material created by individuals who had served on FOBs. The task analysis thus went beyond simple behavioral descriptions, and provided pointers to work in the literature that supported the choice of certain model parameters. For example, respondents indicated that fatigue and environmental conditions were some of the most common stressors. This is supported by research in simulated deployment environments such as the Navy SEALs' Hell Week. In that context, factors such as fatigue and environmental, physical, and psychological stressors were shown to have a greater impact on performance than intoxication, sedatives, or hypoglycemia [12] .
B. Layered Security Business Rules
Business rules, noted here as the relationships among the tasks and the individuals performing them, were also elicited from the SMEs and combined knowledge gained from the print and electronic materials. This allowed the modeling team to identify key locations where activities occurred, important types of players, critical activities and who performed them, and devices and technologies necessary for the performance of the identified activities. A high level picture of some of the activities related to perimeter security is shown in Fig. 2 . It indicates each task that can be accomplished by a person acting alone, a person and technology, or technology acting without human input. The large number of nodes requiring both humans and technology make a strong argument for the sociotechnical SoS approach used to create the model. This task structure is input into the FlexSim model using a process flow capability inherent to the software. An abstracted representation of one area of the layered security system is shown in Fig. 3 for detection tasks. Multiple areas interact to form the entire complex. Each security task requires personnel trained to perform that task and the technology/technologies used by those personnel to execute the task. The task is then carried out using a baseline performance distribution metric and results in one of the four different outcomes (threat detected, false alarm, no threat, and threat undetected) as shown in the process flow. Outcomes for each task are tracked aggregated at the area level and the entire complex level. The simulation then progresses to the next task which has its own unique personnel and technology needs and baseline performance metrics, tracks the outcome, moves to the next task, etc. Multiple items and persons may be present in various areas of the model concurrently, leading to resource contention and longer response times. Other states and metrics are also possible depending on the problem definition.
The model can accommodate multiple variables that could degrade task performance, such as heat, fatigue, time of day, dehydration, length of shift, and hunger. The impact of each variable partly depends on whether the task is primarily physical or primarily cognitive. For example, extreme cold might impact the ability to use a complicated, hand-held user interface that requires fine motor skills and the ability to discriminate through touch. Extreme fatigue, on the other hand, might significantly impact the mental skills necessary for negotiations or the ability to discriminate between real and false identity documents. Since it is the interaction of the human and technology that leads to success, both the human and the technology must be appropriately characterized. 'Training' must be technology-specific (a soldier well-trained on one weapon or analytic tool does not automatically transfer that training to another). Confounding human-related factors such as fatigue, low blood sugar, impaired visibility (due to darkness or other factors) can mitigate the effects of training. The model as it is currently constructed can incorporate many of these factors, and handle external conditions imposed by the environment (e.g., decreased visibility) or factors influencing human performance such as extreme fatigue.
Though there is a seemingly combinatorial explosion in possible system states, the team has experience building SoS models that are vastly larger but still tractable due to three main considerations. First, various best modeling practices and UI features within FlexSim allow scalability with regards to the mechanics of building the model. Second, most SoS have limited touch-points and interdependencies between systems which helps the modeler to capture the right interdependencies between systems/agents. Lastly, the desire to adequately sample and understand behaviors beyond the nominal/average can usually be addressed reasonably well by leveraging statistical sampling techniques in combination with parallel processing. With these methods, the intractable problem of layered security (and other SoS models) is simplified enough to model within the given framework while still capturing the critical interactive effects inherent to the SoS.
C. Modeling Scaling Factors Within the SoS Framework
The associated baseline probability of success for each specific task in the SoS model was established from existing studies and SME input. Since most tasks are performed by humans using certain technologies, changing the state of the humans (personnel with higher levels of training are, in general, more likely to be successful, for example, as are wellrested personnel), changing the technology, or changing both can alter the probability of completing a given task. Also, some conditions may affect only the human (such as sleep deprivation) or only the technology (known failure rates in certain temperatures). Furthermore, it is clear that many important effects are a function of both the human and the technology and only occur when a person is using a particular technology under certain mental and physical conditions. A soldier may perform well on a firing range or in a training environment with a particular weapon with a specific interface, but in cognitively-demanding combat situations, performance with the same weapon may be degraded. Alternatively, a communication vehicle (such as a radio) may have a very low failure rate, but a Marine juggling several radios in a high pressure situation may choose the incorrect radio for the particular communication. The radio technology works, the communication is transmitted, but the intent is not achieved.
These additional factors alter the performance of security tasks by scaling the baseline probability of success for each applicable task. Multiple factors can impact the same metric to quantify complex combinations of both positive and negative factors. A human performance calculation, modified from Wincek and Haight's human error rate formulas [13] , was formulated for this research as the following. AHP = BHP * HPM1 * HPM2 *…* HPMn (1) where AHP is the adjusted human performance, BHP is the baseline human performance, and HPM is the human performance modifier [14] . Modifiers greater than one represent factors that positively impact performance (easier to use technology, better training, etc.) while modifiers less than one represent factors that negatively impact performance (fatigue, weather, etc.). Other methods may be used when more is known about the combinatorial effects of the modifiers.
As the simulation progresses, the model is perturbed by various threats, including malicious outsiders (or insiders), contraband items, suspicious activity outside the perimeter, and VBIEDs which are all randomly generated in the simulation. The model also captures the interactive effects between the human operators, technology and the environment, and allows the use of alternate processes and performance factors based on resource availability. Metrics track how many times the human and the layered security system are able to correctly detect, assess, and respond to these threats, and how many times they fail. These metrics can be used to calculate system performance for individual areas and the FOB as a whole.
V. APPLYING DETECTION THEORY TO SOCIOTECHNICAL SYSTEM OF SYSTEMS
The use of a layered security system as a target application allowed the team to develop a novel method to determine the effectiveness of a security system, where the SoS is defined as a sociotechnical system, i.e., both the human and the technical systems, and their interactions. Currently, most techniques for evaluating such systems consider the human element as simply another technology, or assume perfect functioning of the human element, without taking into account factors that can lead to human performance failures, or the consequences of the interaction of human and technical systems [15] . The method to measure overall system performance developed through the research presented here incorporates all elements of a complex sociotechnical SoS. The method uses a metric called d' (dprime), which was derived from signal detection theory. This metric provides a single number which represents the complex interplay of the accurate detection of attacks or threats (effectiveness) and accurate recognition of when there is no attack or threat (efficiency). It takes into account both the human and the physical systems, and their interaction, yielding results that are sometimes surprising compared to those obtained from analyzing the systems separately.
A. Elements of d-prime
Any assessment of a physical security system considers three functional elements: detection, delay, and response [15] . Calculation of d' for this domain requires the addition of communication as a fourth functional element. Note that communication-indeed, all of the functional elementsincorporates both human and technical aspects.
Consider, for example, a notional representation of an entry checkpoint to a secure area in terms of these elements, as shown in Fig. 4 . The guard has created a mental construct of a threat based on training. This construct is augmented by realtime information conveyed to the guard from a control center and elsewhere on the complex through radios (technology). The guard also has a physical state defined by parameters such as fatigue. Using various technologies, the guard will examine a vehicle (a technical artifact) and/or a person. The guard will make a threat/no threat decision (the detection element), implement delaying tactics such as directing the vehicle to a holding area or denying entry if a threat is perceived (the delay element), and convey a determination and actions to a control center via radio (the communication element). Using radios, the control center will communicate with personnel who can take necessary action (the response element). Both people and technologies contribute to the actualization of each element. 
B. Calculating d-prime
Using the outcomes for the four functional elements of the layered security we can express d' using the following equation developed in detection theory [16, 17] .
where P hit is the probability of detecting correctly a threat or target, P FA is the probability of a false alarm, and the function z(), also called the z-score, is a translation into standard deviation units from the mean of a normal distribution. Response bias is also tracked by the model though the calculation is outside the scope of this paper.
Determining d' and response bias in the analysis of human behavior allows for a complete consideration of the trade humans make between perfect hit rates (calling everything a threat, so all 'true' threats are called) and perfect false alarm rates (calling nothing a threat) when each event is characterized as a binary response (yes/no). Similarly, in a physical system, each component (e.g., sensor) can be characterized as a series of yes/no decisions (alarm/don't alarm). As such, calculating d' and response bias to each component in a physical security system seems a natural application of the method. However, we must also consider the SoS structure of the physical security system. Thus, in order for d' and response bias to be of operational use in a physical security environment, there must be a way to combine d' and response bias values for each component in order to estimate these values for the SoS.
Calculation of probability of hit and probability of false alarm for individual elements in a security system is as follows.
P FA = # false alarms / # no-threat events
Since we are also interested in calculating the d' of the entire physical security system, P hit and P FA must also be calculated for the entire system. For the physical security system as a whole, the value of d' would be interpreted as the effectiveness of a physical security system to handle actual threats and the distraction of false alarms.
Using d' calculations of each element in the system, where the elements are combinations of humans and technologies performing according to certain parameters, and combining these functional elements using probability rules as they work in either parallel or serial configurations, we are able to calculate d' for both the individual areas of the model and the entire physical security system of the FOB. A detailed discussion of this calculation is outside the scope of this paper. Note that despite reasonably good individual performance of each of the elements, the system-wide ability of the physical security system to distinguish a target from a non-target is much poorer than that of the elements considered separately due to the effect of combining the d' of individual elements.
When a simulated d' of the overall physical security system is measured in the simulation model for a single trial of the simulation, we expect to see a step function based on the various times when tasks take place and threat determinations are made. A notional representation of this step function for a 24 hour period is shown in Fig. 6 .
A more useful analysis is to look at the aggregated d' of many trials of the simulation, which produces a much smoother curve than a single trial. A notional representation of d' from a 100 trial run of the FOB simulation is shown in Fig. 7 for the baseline case and an excursion where the soldiers are experiencing extreme fatigue during the 30 day simulation. In both cases, d' starts off at a lower level, gradually ramps up during the first 15 days, and then levels off. This trend is due to a learning curve incorporated into the model as the soldiers (assumed to be new to the FOB at time zero) acquire experience and knowledge during their first two weeks. Note that the variation of d' for the extreme fatigue case is presumed greater than for the baseline case. The greater variation results from a larger difference between tasks that are not impacted by fatigue and tasks where performance is severely degraded because of fatigue. Even though some tasks are not correlated to fatigue, the overall d' in the extreme fatigue case remains lower than in the baseline case due to the effect of combining the individual elements into the SoS level d'.
The assessment of d' within this particular modeling methodology depends on properly quantifying the outcomes of tasks and their potential impacts within a discrete event framework. Another option to increase fidelity would be to feed information forward from this model to a force-on-force model, which could then assess the likely outcomes of ambiguous situations to better inform behavior in grey areas.
VI. CONCLUSION
The model and associated simulation described here show that in a complex sociotechnical SoS, altering any one of the parameters in either the physical or human system, or altering the ways in which these two systems interact can alter the performance of the overall system. For layered security systems, the extension of the calculation of d' from elements of the system to the full system provides a useful single metric for system performance. It also clearly illustrates that while all elements of the human and physical systems may perform well in isolation from each other and/or the deployment environment, integration of these elements under real-time conditions may yield performance results far below those of the systems in isolation.
VII. FUTURE WORK
The research team is currently conducting a sensitivity analysis to determine which groupings of task elements have the largest impact on the d' of the entire physical security system for the FOB application. Even with approximate data, the given modeling framework provides great insight into which areas are critical and would thus be good candidates for investment in task performance studies. For models where data exists, human factors studies, cognitive task analysis, HSI studies, analogues from literature, and task performance studies can be used to validate the input obtained from SME's, field interviews, literature reviews, etc.
After the sensitivity analysis, the team has planned excursions that will be run to look at the impact of human factors, technology factors, external factors, and combinations of the three on d'. The model will also need to be validated. For baseline behavior, high-level metrics may be used to calibrate/validate the model, but in non-nominal operating conditions, face validation from SMEs will likely provide the best insight as to whether unintuitive model behavior is indicative of faulty modeling/assumptions or reveals rare behavior that could in fact happen under certain conditions.
Further research and development is needed to extend this proof-of-concept model beyond the layered security application described here. A discrete event stochastic simulation framework was the appropriate choice to model task performance and human-technology interaction and would likely useful in other applications. However, some sociotechnical systems may be structured in such a way that leveraging/interacting with agent-based modeling or hybrid dynamical system modeling could be beneficial. More research is needed to define the linkages between the discrete event model and these additional models.
